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ARTICLES
PROTECTING CONSUMERS
FROM SPYWARE:
A PROPOSED CONSUMER DIGITAL
TRESPASS ACT
RICHARD G. KUNKEL*
We live in an online world. Nearly two billion people worldwide are
Internet users.1 There are an estimated 239 million Internet users in
the United States, which means over seventy-seven percent of Americans are Internet users.2 Internet use in the United States rose by 146
percent from 2000 to 2010.3 Using the Internet is a common, and important, part of American life. We go online to work, to play, to shop or
engage in commercial transactions, to obtain news, and for entertainment. We can engage in all of these activities only if we remain “wired”
to the Internet. However, by obtaining access to the benefits of the Internet world, we also expose ourselves to a number of online risks such
as identity theft, fraud, and other forms of cyber-crimes. Another risk is
exposure to “spyware.”
“Spyware” is a broad term used to describe software that resides on
a user’s computer and monitors the user’s online behavior. Information
about user behavior is then reported to others in order to enable responsive targeted interactions such as context sensitive advertising, en* Richard G. Kunkel, J.D., is an Associate Professor of Business Law in the department of Ethics and Business Law, in the Opus College of Business at the University of St.
Thomas, St. Paul, MN. The author thanks Pam, Erin, Patrick and Leah for their love and
support, and Dawn R. Swink for her encouragement and collegiality.
1. Internet Usage Statistics: World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNETWORLDSTATS.COM (June 20, 2010), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.
(An estimated 1,966,514,816 people were Internet users as of June 20, 2010).
2. Internet Usage Statistics: Internet Usage and Population Statistics for North
America, INTERNETWORLDSTATS.COM (June 30, 2010), http://www.internetworldstats.com/
stats14.htm#north. (There were an estimated 239,232,863 Internet users in the U.S. as of
December 31, 2009, for a penetration rate of 77.4 percent).
3. Id.
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hanced search, or other legal or illegal activities.4 Spyware may be
helpful or benign (e.g. “cookies” that assist online shopping), or it can be
very annoying (e.g. “adware” producing numerous pop-up ads covering
the entire screen, interfering with use). More recently, much spyware is
used for malicious purposes and also is classified as “malware.” One type
of malware includes programs that steal personal information and passwords that cyber-criminals use in identity theft, phishing scams. Other
malware programs infect the user’s computer and turn it into a “zombie”
on a botnet.5 The botnet is then used to send unsolicited commercial
email (“spam”) and other malware. Legitimate business interests also
use spyware to capture personal information enabling them to track the
online behavior of their customers to assist with targeted advertising,
selling goods, and other uses.
Consumers are especially vulnerable to online spyware threats because they (or the children in their family) often lack sophistication to
avoid risky online practices or to recognize situations in which they
download spyware.6 Often spyware is installed without the computer
user’s knowledge, or without a bona fide consent of an adult, and will
degrade computer usability and functionality and be extremely difficult
to remove.7 Spyware distributors target homes with child users or teenage users because such users are more easily induced to download “free”
content that is bundled with software containing spyware. For example,
social networking sites that are popular with teenagers and young adult
computer users, such as MySpace and Facebook, have become significant
sources for new spyware installations.8 Peer-to-peer (P2P) sites such as
BitTorrent, BearShare and Limewire also are vulnerable to spyware-in4. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: MONITORING SOFTWARE ON YOUR PC: SPYADWARE, AND OTHER SOFTWARE 2-7 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/
03/050307spywarerpt.pdf [hereinafter, “FTC Report”].
5. A bot is a software robot that can be controlled remotely. It infects a computer
without the knowledge of the computer use through a virus or worm that carries a Trojan
program. Criminals who send out the bots typically use them to infest large numbers of
computers, known as zombies, to create a network. These networks are referred to as
botnets, and those who create them are known as botherders. Bots, Botnets and Zombies,
MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/technologies/bots.mspx (last visited
Jan. 5, 2010).
WARE,

6. One study found spyware on personal computers in 69% of households with children under 18, but that only 8% were aware of the spyware on their computers. AMERICA
ONLINE & NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY ALLIANCE, AOL/NCSA Online Safety Study 6-7
(2004), available at ftp://rixstep.com/safety_study_v04.pdf.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Elinor Mills, Microsoft Helps Keep Koobface Virus Off Facebook, CNET NEWS (Apr.
2, 2009, 10:33 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10210376-83.html; Arik Hesseldahl,
Social-Networking Sites a “Hotbed” For Spyware, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2006,
6:10 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14413906/.
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fected content.9
Consequently by the mid-2000s, eighty-nine percent of consumer
personal computers were infected with spyware despite a high degree of
awareness about the spyware problem.10 On average, a consumer PC
had thirty different spyware programs installed.11 Consumers often
cannot afford to purchase and continually upgrade state-of-the-art antispyware software. They also lack the technical skills to repeatedly install upgrades and to maintain their system software, Internet browsers,
and other web-application software as spyware threats quickly evolve.
Spyware plays an important role in facilitating spam, identity theft,
phishing scams, and the spread of botnets used to distribute malware to
consumer computers.12
Consumers need new legal protection to prevent their own property—their computers—from being used against them as a spying device. Existing criminal laws have had minimal effect upon the
prevalence of spyware used for cybercrime. Under tort law, consumers
may be able to pursue a claim under a trespass to chattels. Such claims
arise only after damage has occurred to their computers.13 This is not
sufficient legal protection to stop the proliferation of spyware on consumers’ computers. In contrast, tort protection for real property interests
allows legal recourse for trespass even though no damage has occurred.
Applying a similar approach to spyware would provide the stronger legal
protection that consumers need. Obviously it would significantly distort
common law tort theories to attempt to construe consumers’ desktops as
a form of “real estate.” Thus, this article recommends the creation of a
new statutory remedy to address spyware harms comparable to the tort
remedies for trespass to real property.
This paper will first discuss the nature and scope of the spyware and
malware problems affecting consumers. Second, the difficulty of applying the traditional tort theories of trespass and trespass to chattels to the
problem of spyware will be explored. Next, the paper will argue that
consumers’ desktops are analogous to real property. Such “digital real
estate” will best be protected by a private right of action that treats con9. Andrew J. Kalafut, et al., A Study of Malware in Peer-to-Peer Networks, IMC’06
(2006), available at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/~minaxi/pubs/imc06.pdf. A month of data
show that 68% of all downloadable responses in Limewire containing archives and executables contain malware. Id.
10. WEBROOT SOFTWARE, INC., STATE OF SPYWARE, SECOND QUARTER 2006, 11 (2006),
www.webroot.com/pdf/2006-q2-sos-US.pdf.
11. Id.
12. SYMANTEC INC., SYMANTEC GLOBAL INTERNET SECURITY REPORT: TRENDS FOR 2008,
5 (2009), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_inter
net_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf.
13. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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sumers’ computers similarly to the tort protection provided for real estate interests. Finally, this paper will propose a new statute to address
the widespread use of spyware methods by legitimate business interests
engaged in behavioral advertising. These businesses include search
sites, news and media websites financed by targeted advertising, Internet service providers (ISPs), advertising networks and online
merchants. The proposed “Consumer Digital Trespass Act” (the
“CDTA”) would create a private cause of action based on concepts from
real property and tort law. If enacted, the CDTA would effectively discourage legitimate business interests from using spyware to monitor consumer behavior and will provide consumers with the legal remedies to
regain control over their desktops.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SPYWARE THREAT
Spyware began to emerge as a threat in the late 1990s and the first
anti-spyware programs appeared in 2000.14 Spyware frequently interferes with proper functioning of computers and causes them to crash,
exposes private information to theft, drives up tech support costs for
computer users, manufacturers and Internet service providers, and can
cause a host of other harms.15 By 2005, Webroot Software estimated
that eighty percent of all computers scanned by it contained spyware.16
At that time, adware programs were the most common form of spyware.
These programs tracked users’ web browsing in order to repeatedly serve
multiple online ads that covered the entire screen and obstructed further
use of the computer. One anti-spyware software manufacturer detected
nearly 40 million adware installations in use.17 Adware merchants made
easy money by creating extensive networks, often by using deceptive installation methods. The total adware market was estimated to be $2 billion in 2005.18
In April 2004, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) convened a public workshop to discuss issues related to spyware, and in March 2005
FTC issued a staff report on spyware.19 By 2005, widespread problems
with spyware raised awareness such that 96% of computer users were
familiar with the term “spyware.”20 Enforcement actions by the Federal
14. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
15. Id.
16. WEBROOT SOFTWARE, INC., STATE OF SPYWARE, SECOND QUARTER 2005, 43 (2005),
http://www.webroot.com/pdf/2005-q2-sos.pdf.
17. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 12; see also infra note 123.
18. Tom Zeller, New Program Takes Aim at Purveyors of Malicious Software, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/technology/25spy.
html?_r=1.
19. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-7.
20. AMERICA ONLINE & NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY ALLIANCE, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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Trade Commission and state attorneys general helped to discourage the
most serious adware abuses.21 Private litigation that named advertisers
as co-defendants also chilled the market for adware.22 Although adware
prevalence dipped somewhat in 2005, it had risen again to 59% of surveyed computers in 2006.23 Consumers were the primary targets.
Spyware attacks on home users accounted for 93% of all targeted attacks
in 2006.24 By 2009, Consumer Reports estimated that spyware infections caused 545,000 households to replace their computers, and caused
total damages of $1.7 billion.25
Spyware often initially appeared in the form of viruses, worms, and
other simple and visible attacks directed at disrupting the operations of
computing devices. This continues in the form of sophisticated botnet
networks today.26 However, spyware has evolved to also include sophisticated web based attacks directed at the end users. Current attacks
have the goal of obtaining personal information needed to commit financial fraud and other profitable illegal activity.27 Criminals use spyware
as part of their professional enterprise to make money by any means,
legal or not. Cyber criminals now seek vulnerabilities in web browsers
and other Internet applications to trick users into clicking on malware
links that have been installed on legitimate, but compromised websites.28 For example, one site spoofed President Obama’s official inauguration site and duped visitors into downloading spyware.29 In addition,
21. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Zango, Inc. Settles FTC Charges (Nov.
3, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/11/zango.shtm; Press Release, N.Y. Office of the Att’y
Gen., Groundbreaking Settlements Hold Online Advertisers Responsible For Displaying
Ads Through Deceptively Installed “Adware” Programs, (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.
oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/jan/jan29b_07.html.
22. See, e.g., Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
23. WEBROOT SOFTWARE, INC., STATE OF SPYWARE, FIRST QUARTER 2006,9 (2006), http://
www.webroot.com/pdf/2006-q1-sos.pdf.
24. SYMANTEC INC., “SYMANTEC INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT: TRENDS FOR JULYDECEMBER 06, 5 (2007), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/entwhitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf.
25. State of the Net 2009, CONSUMER REPORTS, (June 2009), available at http://www.
consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/june-2009/electronicscomputers/state-of-thenet/state-of-the-net-2009/state-of-the-net-2009.htm.
26. MCAFEE, INC., 2009 THREAT PREDICTIONS 1 (2009) http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_
content/reports/2009_threat_predictions_report.pdf.
27. SYMANTEC INC., SYMANTEC GLOBAL INTERNET SECURITY REPORT: TRENDS FOR 2008,
5 (2009), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_inter
net_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf.
28. SOPHOS, TOP FIVE STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING MODERN THREATS: IS ANTI-VIRUS
DEAD? 1 (2008). https://secure.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/papers/sophos-combatingthreats-wpna.pdf.
29. Thomas Claburn, Fake Obama Web Site Reportedly Builds Botnet, INFORMATION
WEEK (Jan. 20, 2009, 3:05 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/government/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=212901473.
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seventy percent of the most frequently visited websites have either
hosted malware or provided links to sites that hosted malware.30 McAfee Security identified nearly 1.5 million items of malware in 2008
alone. Ninety percent of malware files are password-stealing Trojans designed to facilitate financial fraud and other criminal activity.31
One of today’s most dangerous forms of spyware is the software used
to convert desktop computers into “zombies” as part of “botnets” of
networked computers controlled remotely by professional cyber
criminals. Symantec reported an average of over 75,000 active botnets
operating per day in 2008, an increase of thirty-one percent over 2007.32
The eleven largest botnets control over one million computers and can
distribute more than 100 billion spam messages per day, which distribute even more malware.33 Spam now makes up more than ninety
percent of all e-mail.34 These botnets and the cybercrime activities that
they support pose a substantial threat to U.S. businesses and financial
systems. Use of botnets for distributed denial of service attacks against
Internet service providers, domain name registries, and other targets is
increasing.35 Economic losses due to cyber threats may be as much as
$300 million per day.36
Government resources directed to combat spyware have been insufficient, and spyware defenses have been left to the private sector.37 As a
result, the security software industry had annual revenues of $14.5 billion dollars in 2009, and is expected to reach $16.3 billion by 2010.38
Government regulators have only limited enforcement resources to take
30. Thomas Claburn, 70 Of Top 100 Web Sites Spread Malware, Information Week
(Jan. 20, 2009, 4:45 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=212901775.
31. MCAFEE, INC., supra note 26.
32. SYMANTEC INC., SYMANTEC GLOBAL INTERNET SECURITY REPORT: TRENDS FOR 2008,
5 (2009), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_inter
net_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf.
33. Gregg Keizer, Top Botnets Control 1M Hijacked Computers, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr.
9, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticle
Basic&articleId=9076278.
34. Lance Whitney, Report: Spam Now 90 Percent of All E-Mail, CNET NEWS, (May 26,
2009, 9:24 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10249172-83.html?tag=mncol;posts.
35. Brian Krebs, Experts Chart Spike in Cyber Sieges, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/01/AR2009050101593_pf.html.
36. Cybersecurity: Network Threats and Policy Challenges; Hearing Before the H. Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., and the Internet, 111th Cong. 1 (2009)
(Testimony of Larry Clinton, President, Internet Security Alliance), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090501/testimony_clinton.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Press Release, Gartner, Inc., Gartner Says Worldwide Security Software Market
on Pace to Grow 8 Per Cent in 2009 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.gartner.com/
it/page.jsp?id=1184713.
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action against deceptive practices by enterprises using spyware to harm
consumers. For example, even at the height of the adware craze, the
FTC completed only eleven enforcement actions, and just ten enforcement cases by states.39 The explosive growth in cybercrime triggered
President Obama’s 2009 Cyber-Security Plan—a coordinated legal and
technical response involving government, law enforcement, the security
software industry, Internet companies, and businesses.40 Consequently,
this paper will not attempt to address this broad spectrum of online
criminal activity.
This article instead will focus upon the ways in which legitimate
businesses use spyware methods to surreptitiously monitor consumers’
Internet activity for commercial gain, and will propose a solution to protect consumers. Legitimate business websites use spyware on consumers’ computers to capture private online behavior and personal
information—primarily for the purpose of facilitating sales of online advertising or for generating online sales. Internet advertising revenues
increased 10.6% in 2008 to $23 billion,41 and revenues have increased
twelve-fold since 1998.42 As more advertising dollars compete for the
limited space on computer screens and mobile devices, advertisers are
seeking increasingly targeted advertising that depends upon extensive
monitoring of users’ private browsing behavior and preferences. McAfee
reports that most websites continue to use pop-up ad screens, despite
blocking software.43 Internet service providers (ISPs) also have considered spying upon consumers’ online activity by conducting a “deep packet
inspection” of each private Internet transmission made by their customers.44 The Federal Trade Commission has issued self-regulatory guide39. Combating Spyware: H.R. 964 (the Spy Act) Before The H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., 110th Cong. 1-2 (2007)
(testimony of Ari Schwartz, Deputy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology), available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/20070315schwartzspwyare_2.pdf.
40. David E. Sanger & John Markoff, Obama Outlines Coordinated Cyber-Security
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/us/politics/30cyber.
html.
41. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, LLP, 2008 INTERNET ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT 3 (2009), http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_PwC_
2008_full_year.pdf.
42. Press Release, Internet Advertising Bureau, First Quarter 1999 Internet Advertising Revenues Double Over First Quarter 1998 (Aug. 17, 1999), http://www.iab.net/about_
the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/58589. Internet advertising revenues for 1998 were $1.92 billion, compared to $23.4 billion in 2008.
43. MCAFEE, INC. MCAFEE THREATS REPORT: FIRST QUARTER 2009, 12 (2009), http://
img.en25.com/Web/McAfee/5395rpt_avert_quarterly-threat_0409_v3.pdf.
44. See Communications Networks and Consumer Privacy: Recent Developments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Commc’ns, Tech., and the Internet, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
(statement of Leslie Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer,Center for Democracy
and Technology), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090423/testi-

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-2\SFT201.txt

192

unknown

Seq: 8

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

6-JUL-11

14:32

[Vol. XXVIII

lines for online advertising45 but continues to lack serious enforcement
capability. Consumers need legal protection to stop this intrusive use of
their own computers by businesses interested in seeking to monitor their
private information. Since government regulators lack sufficient enforcement resources, the best solution is to empower consumers with a
private right of action to protect their desktop “real estate.”
II. TRESPASS TO LAND AND TRESPASS TO
CHATTELS IN CYBERSPACE
The manner in which the torts of trespass to land and trespass to
chattels would apply to the spyware context would, at first blush, seem
obvious. Consumers own their computers. It is their personal property.
Computers clearly are not real property, and thus, the tort of trespass to
land would not apply. Consumers have legally protected rights in their
computers, including the right to exclude others from making unauthorized use of the computer.46 Thus, it seems apparent that those who install spyware on another’s computer without consent would be liable for
trespass to chattels.
The tort of trespass to chattels, unlike trespass to land, requires
proof of actual damage to the chattel before an action can be brought.47
The Restatement of Torts provides that a trespass to chattels arises only
if the trespasser:
(a) . . . dispossesses the other of the chattel, or
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial
time, or
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some
person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected
interest.48

Early cases applying trespass to chattels to online interferences, or
“cybertrespass,” focused on whether unauthorized transmission of data
mony_harris.pdf. See also, Jeremy Kirk, Adware Company Refines Opt-Out, Notification
Technology, NETWORK WORLD (Jul. 8, 2008, 11:30 AM), available at http://www.network
world.com/news/2008/070808-adware-company-refines-opt-out-notification.html?ry=gs
(describing the activities of targeted advertisers NebuAd and Phorm).
45. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavad
report.pdf.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 217, 218 (1965). See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors On The Internet: The Real Problem With The
Doctrine Of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 294 (2006); Patricia
L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2164, n.15 (2004).
47. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14 (W. Page Keeton et. al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 218 (1965).
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to or from another’s computer, and use of the computer’s storage and
processing capacity, was sufficient damage to trigger legal protection.
In CompuServe v. CyberPromotions,49 the defendant continued to
transmit unsolicited commercial e-mail (“spam”) through CompuServe’s
servers to CompuServe’s subscribers after receiving a cease and desist
letter. The court found sufficient harm existed because the defendant’s
use of CompuServe’s computers to distribute the spam consumed CompuServe’s server disk space and consumed processing power.50 Several
other spam-related cases have reached similar conclusions.51
EBay v. Bidder’s Edge52 involved data stored on eBay’s servers and
displayed on eBay’s auction site. Bidder’s Edge used automated web spiders to retrieve data from eBay and other auction sites, which it aggregated and displayed on the Bidder’s Edge auction aggregation site.53 At
first, eBay permitted Bidder’s Edge to do so.54 Later, the parties began
negotiations for a license for Bidder’s Edge to continue its data retrieval
practices.55 When negotiations broke down, eBay ordered Bidder’s Edge
to stop, but it did not do so.56 The court found that the minimal use of
eBay’s system by Bidder’s Edge’s spiders was sufficient damage to constitute a trespass to chattels.57 The court noted that if eBay were unable
to control access to its property by aggregators, others would likely engage in similar activities that could overwhelm the servers.58 A similar
result was reached in Register.com Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,59 in which the
court enjoined use of web robots to compile data from a domain name
database available on the Internet.
The legal trend toward recognition of de minimus interferences as
sufficient damage to trigger trespass to chattels claims continued in Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi.60 Hamidi was a former Intel employee who sent six
mass email messages critical of Intel.61 These messages were sent over a
twenty month period to several thousand e-mail addresses of Intel employees.62 Intel first attempted to block the emails from Hamidi, but
49. CompuServe v. CyberPromotions, 925 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
50. Id. at 1022.
51. See Bellia, supra note 46, at 2176, at fn. 30.
52. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d. 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
53. Id. at 1060.
54. Id. at 1061.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1062-63.
57. Id. at 1070-1071.
58. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
59. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396 & 404 (2d Cir. 2004).
60. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal.Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296
(Cal. 2003).
61. Id. at 246.
62. Id.
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Hamidi thwarted the blocking attempts by sending the messages from
other computers.63 Finally, Intel sent Hamidi a letter demanding that
he stop sending the emails, but Hamidi continued.64 There was no evidence that distribution of the six emails from Hamidi had damaged Intel’s servers or impaired their functioning.65 Yet, the trial court enjoined
Hamidi from sending unsolicited e-mails to addresses on Intel’s e-mail
system.66 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the unauthorized use could trigger injunctive relief without proof of any actual
damage to Intel’s personal property under the theory of trespass to
chattels.67
At this point in the evolution of the tort of “cybertrespass,” courts
had essentially eliminated the element of damage from the traditional
trespass to chattels claim. In so doing, the cybertrespass became indistinguishable from trespass to land, for which damage is not an element.68 These rulings emphasized the computer owner’s right to exclude
others from unauthorized uses, and extended to computer systems the
same inviolability of proprietary rights that had existed for real estate
for centuries. Computers connected to the Internet were, in effect,
treated like real property.
These decisions triggered an avalanche of legal scholarship critical
of the new doctrine of cybertrespass.69 Critics argued that by extending
property rule protections to computer systems that these claims would
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 261.
66. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944, at *1, *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999).
67. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,114 Cal.Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 71 P.3d 296
(Cal. 2003).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 158 (1965); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 1413 (W. Page Keeton et. al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
69. See e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 53 (2000); Steve Fischer, When Animals Attack:
Spiders and Internet Trespass, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 139 (2001); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L REV. 439 (2003);
Steven Kam, Note, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of CyberNuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 448-52 (2004); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers
Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV.
179, 203-06 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L REV. 521 (2003);
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 Duke L.J. 1783 (2002); R. Clifton Merrell, Note, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 687-97
(2002); Adam Mossoff, Spam - Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625, 629
(2004); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search
of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke,
Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1965 (2000); Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421 (2002).
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overly “propertize” the Internet.70 A broad right to exclude would allow
to each individual system owner to specify the desired and undesired
uses of their site. Critics feared that such rules would restrict the free
flow of informational resources on the Internet and create a default rule
of closed access to websites. They also feared the right to exclude would
block harmless but productive online interactions, stifle development
and growth of the Internet and even have the effect of producing an
“anti-commons.”71 Supporters of the cybertrespass decisions argued that
strong property rule protection of computer systems and resources would
encourage development of Internet resources and maximize efficiencies
of online networks.72 The formerly obscure tort of trespass to chattels
suddenly became the focal point in a policy debate regarding the most
discussed topics in cyberlaw: 1) to what degree may computer owners
using the Internet control or exclude unwanted uses of their systems;
and 2) what degree of damage is sufficient to trigger legal protection?
The California Supreme Court found itself in the midst of this
heated environment when it heard Hamidi’s appeal. The court —perhaps persuaded by the arguments made by cybertrespass critics that
strong protection of the property rights of computer users would compromise the flow of network resources on the Internet—restored the damage
requirement for recovery in trespass to chattels cases. The court ruled
that because Hamidi had caused no harm to Intel’s computer hardware
or software, nor interfered with its intended operation, nor dispossessed
Intel, nor caused Intel’s system to be slowed or impaired, nor imposed
any marginal costs on Intel, that an action for trespass to chattels did
not arise.73 This decision, too, has been criticized for failing to strike the
proper balance between the rights of computer system owners to control
use of their private resources and the free flow of networked information
70. See e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L REV. 439 (2003) and Bellia, supra note 46.
71. See Bellia, supra note 46, at 2170-71, 2180-81. If the right to exclude were too
strong, Internet users would have to negotiate license terms with each web site owner.
This would stifle normal Web activities such as indexing and web-linking. This would
cause the common resource of the Internet to be under utilized because it has too many
property owners unable to effectively agree or cooperate in its use, creating an anti-commons. See also, Dan L. Burk, supra note 69, at 53.
72. See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84 (2003)
(“strong property rights for non-network elements function as well in cyberspace as they do
anywhere else.”); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 804, 818-21 (2001); Daniel Kearney, Network Effects and the Emerging
Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 313 (2005) (arguing that a clear rule of
cybertrespass will maximize the efficiencies of online networks); David McGowan, Website
Access: The Case for Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 341, 375-83 (2003) (explaining benefits of
property-rule approach over damages rule such as nuisance); Richard Warner, Virtual Borders: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2002).
73. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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resources on the Internet.74
Applying the California Supreme Court’s holding in Hamidi to
spyware cases, it is likely that many consumers would be able to prove
damage sufficient to bring a successful trespass to chattels claim.
Spyware and malware programs cause harm to computers by causing
them to freeze or crash, when the programs interfere with intended operations by covering the display screen with advertisements or sending
spam,75 or when users lose control of their computer because it has been
taken over by a botnet. Because malware distributed by cyber-criminals
uses or intermeddles with the personal property of computer users, and
causes damage in a variety of ways, trespass to chattels may appear to
provide an effective remedy for consumer spyware victims in such cases.
However, behavioral targeting by legitimate businesses is less likely to
cause serious harmful interference with consumer computers.
Yet consumers may encounter significant obstacles to recovery on
their trespass to chattels claim. First is the issue of consent, a recognized defense to an intentional tort.76 Frequently spyware is distributed
by bundling it with other “free” software downloads and other content
desired by consumers, such as YouTube videos, mp3 music files, peer-topeer file sharing software, and other files.77 Spyware vendors contend
that each download is preceded by an ostensible consent given by the
consumer when they click “Download” or “I agree” on a pop-up browser
screen.
Consumers’ right to use their computers as they wish should include
the freedom to agree to accept advertising or tracking software in exchange for software and other content that they find convenient or valuable, provided the consent is fully informed and knowingly given.
However, the genuineness of the consent given to trigger a bundled
download of “freeware” and spyware is open to a number of challenges.
First, while the consumer may be consenting to installation of the desired free content, it is often highly dubious that they even know of,
much less are consenting to, installation of a bundle that includes
spyware.78 Second, the FTC has chronicled several deceptive practices
used to install spyware ranging from installations without notice, “popunder exploits” (which make the installation appear to be related to a
true site visited by the user), fake operating system messages, and “Can74. Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 147 (2005).
75. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
76. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (W. Page Keeton et. al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984).
77. WEBROOT SOFTWARE, INC., STATE OF SPYWARE, supra note 16, at 9.
78. Ben Edelman, Media Files that Spread Spyware, (Jan. 2, 2005), http://www.
benedelman.org/news/010205-1.html.
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cel” buttons that actually continue the installation.79 Spyware critic Ben
Edelman has documented a variety of deceptive installation methods on
his website.80 Third, modern malware threats attempt to induce users
to merely play a video clip, an mp3 file, or click a link to an interesting
news story to trigger a malware download. In these cases, consumers
have no idea that they have initiated a download, much less consented to
one.81
When legitimate businesses seek permission to track consumers’ online behavior, the purported consent may take the form of a “terms of
use” link on the website of the business, or by a clickwrap license or a
browsewrap license.82 Commentators have questioned whether this
manifests an informed subjective assent to enter into a contractual
agreement to authorize spyware installation, or rather, is merely an objective act to trigger the download of the free digital content.83 Edelman
has criticized the lengthy and complicated license agreements used by
adware firms that can only be displayed on dozens of computer screens.84
For example, if a consumer sought information on the monitoring policies of Google’s Gmail email service, it would require approximately nine
mouse clicks and the reading of terms equaling seventeen printed
pages.85 Thus consumers may be able to successfully argue that any
79. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 55-57.
80. Ben Edelman, Spyware: Research, Testing, Legislation and Suits, http://www.
benedelman.org/spyware (last updated Feb. 2, 2010). These include sites targeted to children, bundling of spyware with peer-to-peer software at P2P sites, undisclosed licenses and
other practices. Id.
81. SYMANTEC INC., “SYMANTEC INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT: TRENDS FOR JULYDECEMBER 06, 5 (2007), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/entwhitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf.
82. See e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (2006).
83. Jordan M. Blanke, “Robust Notice” and “Informed Consent:” the Keys to Successful
Spyware Legislation, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2006); Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 477 (2002);
Jennifer Femminella, Note, Online Terms and Conditions Agreements: Bound by the Web,
17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 87, 101 (2003); Richard G. Kunkel, Recent Developments
in Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in the United States, 9 MURDOCH U.
ELECTRONIC J.L. 3 (2002), available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n3/kunkel93.html; James J. Tracy, Legal Update: Browsewrap Agreements: Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 11 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. SCI. & TECH. L. 164 (2005).
84. For example, adware firms Claria and WhenU had license pages that were 56 and
45 screens long, respectively. Ben Edelman, Hard-Coding Bias in Google “Algorithmic”
Search Results (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.benedelman.org, (last visited March 25, 2007).
See also, Ben Edelman, Why I Can Never Agree With Adware And Spyware, THE GUARDIAN,
Jan. 25,2007, available at http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/insideit/story/0,,19976
29,00.html.
85. Based on a brief test by the author beginning from the Gmail Home Page on May
29, 2009. These pages do not include the privacy policy of Google generally (5 printed
pages), or for its advertising subsidiary, DoubleClick (4 pages).
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purported consent to the spyware installation when creating such online
accounts and relationships is invalid. In many instances consumers lack
a true understanding of the extent to which they purportedly authorized
others to use their computers as tracking devices.
Another challenge for consumers involves identification of the
tortfeasor. The behavioral advertising business model includes a confusing array of advertisers, interactive agencies, advertising networks,
third party advertising servers, software developers, and publishers.86
Identifying the specific party responsible for installing the spyware causing the damage may be difficult, even though all parties in the advertising distribution chain profit by tracking consumers’ online behavior in
order to sell interactive contextual advertising.
III. REAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO SPYWARE TRESPASSES.
Personal computers exchanging information over the Internet are
not real property. The traditional tort of trespass to land is not applicable to computers infected with spyware. Yet early cybertrespass cases
eviscerated the damage requirement and applied essentially the same
rules as trespass to land. Both before and after the Hamidi case, commentators argued that real property-type rules were well suited to protect rights for computer owners and were an efficient means of allocating
resources on the Internet. Moreover, when it is being used on the Internet a computer has characteristics that are analogous to real property
in two vital respects: 1) its immovability, and 2) the effectiveness of using
self-help to protect the owner’s property interest.
Trespass to land allows legal recourse without proof of damage, even
if the entry is in good faith or by mistake.87 This rule protects the
owner’s right to exclude others and the inviolability of the real property
interest.88 When a continuing trespass or encroachment occurs, the land
obviously cannot be moved out of the possession of the trespasser or encroacher. Since land is immovable, any unprivileged entry to real property is a challenge to the owner’s right to exclude. Tort law permits legal
action to vindicate the property right of the owner, to prevent acquisition
of prescriptive rights, and to avoid breaches of the peace by physical
86. DESILVA & PHILLIPS, LLC, ONLINE AD NETWORKS: MONETIZING THE LONG TAIL 6,
(2008), http://www.iab.net/media/file/AdNetworksWhitePaper.pdf; see also, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, FOLLOWING THE MONEY II: THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN
ADWARE ADVERTISING (2006), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20060809adware.pdf.
87. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (W. Page Keeton et. al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984).
88. Id.
88
Id.
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ejection.89
In contrast, for movable property the tort of trespass to chattels requires actual damage. But because chattels are movable, when a trespasser interferes or meddles with a chattel, owners have the privilege of
self-help. The owner can use self-help to pick up the chattel and remove
it to a place beyond the trespasser’s unwanted interference. For example, if you meddle with the music playlists on my iPod, I can use self-help
to pick up the iPod, take it away from your control, and reset my music
selections. I also can move it away from you, secure it in my possession,
and prevent any further interferences by you. I have no legal remedy for
such harmless intermeddling with the iPod because my privilege to use
self-help to halt unauthorized use is adequate to protect my interests.
The Restatement provides:
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the
similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an
action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddling with the chattel . . . Sufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere
inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable
force to protect his possession against even harmless interference (italics supplied).90

In 2010, a personal computer chattel has its highest and best use
and functionality when used to access the network benefits of the Internet. There is only one Internet. The only way to receive the vast network benefits of the Internet is to be connected to it.91 When online, the
owner exposes herself to a myriad of potential unauthorized uses of her
computer, including spyware, malware and the resulting loss of personal
information and privacy; but under the Hamidi rule, the Internet user
has no legal remedy to prevent such repeated invasions until sufficient
damage to the computer occurs.
For example, suppose a computer was repeatedly subjected to
malware installations of botnet software used to serve spam. Under
Hamidi, the user’s sole remedy is to attempt to exercise self-help by continually patching her system software and running anti-spyware applications to stay a close step behind the spyware merchants attacking her
system. Until the botnet begins spamming and phishing to a sufficient
degree to affect her computer’s performance, or her personal data is hijacked, the consumer waits quietly for the inevitable harm to erupt.
Is it possible for the computer owner to remove her computer from
harm’s way? Could she avoid harm by simply disconnecting from the
Internet? While this is technically possible, she suffers injury by being
89. Id.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (Comment e) (1965).
91. Epstein, Cybertrespass, supra note 61, at 72.
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deprived of one of the primary uses of her computer chattel—the ability
to access the Internet. Could the computer owner choose to access another, different Internet (i.e. one that is not populated with spyware and
malware sites)? No. In this sense the Internet-connected computer is
immovable. It is impossible to both disconnect the computer from dangerous and unauthorized uses, while simultaneously being online using
and enjoying the functionality of the Internet. Since the owner cannot
move the computer and its Internet functionality out of harm’s way without forfeiting a substantial portion of its value, a legal remedy is needed
to protect the owner without the necessity of prior damage to the computer occurring.
The use of self-help for computers on the Internet is also more analogous to real property than to personal property. Since real property is
immovable, the only self-help possible would require physical ejection of
the tortfeasor from the real property. Using self-help backed by force
would likely result in breaches of the peace. Consequently, use of force
and self-help is restricted. Self-help is replaced by the legal right to recover remedies in trespass without proving damage and to eject the trespasser. The legal right to recover remedies in trespass without proving
damage and to eject the trespasser replaces self-help. In cyberspace, the
only complete method of self-help to avoid unauthorized uses is to unplug
from the Internet and forfeit its benefits.92 Perversely, this approach requires the innocent computer owner to eject herself from the useful benefits of the Internet, while the wrongdoers continue to benefit from it by
causing harm.
One partial self-help remedy is to attempt to use anti-virus and antispyware programs to attempt to avoid or defeat (at least temporarily)
unauthorized uses before damage occurs.93 Consumers, in particular,
are ill-equipped to exercise this privilege of self-help in cyberspace.
Many cannot afford the costs of installing current anti-spyware software
and keeping it up-to-date. The form of online threats and the sophistication of the techniques change too frequently. Self-help has become especially difficult for consumers because cyber-thieves manipulate their
fears over spyware to distribute even more malware. Google’s Security
Team reports that fifteen percent of all malware is distributed via fake

92. A partial self-help remedy is to withdraw certain informational goods from the
broader Internet and make them available only to subscribers via password protected accounts. If most computer owners restricted information goods in this way, the broad network effects would be lost and the anti-commons envisioned by property rule critics could
result.
93. Self-help in the form of security software is now a $16 billion dollar industry. Press
Release, Gartner, Inc., supra note 38.
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security and antivirus download scams, also known as “scareware.”94
The F.B.I. estimates that victims have lost up to $150 million from
scareware scams.95
Business and corporate users may have technical support staff to
update software, to install security patches, and to update anti-virus and
anti-spyware software company-wide. However, few consumer users
have the technical prowess to continuously install and maintain effective
anti-spyware software. In addition, the threats are so sophisticated, numerous, and rapidly evolving that even business enterprises are fighting
a losing battle with spyware. In the physical world, self-help may provide “sufficient legal protection”96 of an owner’s inviolability interest in
their chattel. However, in the context of cyberspace, there is no practical
means for consumers to use self-help as a partial or temporary remedy to
protect their computers from harm. In the absence of a legal remedy
without damage occurring, they remain exposed to repeated violations of
their computer assets, their personal information and their privacy.
Finally, for centuries the law has extended special protection to persons in their real property homesteads. The law recognizes the importance of protecting such places to provide persons with a sense of both
privacy and security, including constitutional protection against unwarranted search and seizure.97 Homes hold and secure consumers’ most
personal and treasured keepsakes and their most important records. Increasingly, consumers are storing their keepsakes and records on their
personal computers. They store photos, correspondence, address books,
work projects, financial information, and home videos on their computers.98 Computers are the “digital homesteads” of many consumers
and need additional legal protection from spyware invasions of these
most personal items. Consumers deserve protection for their computers
that is analogous to real property homesteads.
Tort law remedies for spyware trespasses leave consumers poorly
protected. Remedies for trespass to real property are appropriate for
94. Moheeb Abu Rajab, et al., The Nocebo Effect on the Web: An Analysis of Fake AntiVirus Distribution, 3RD USENIX WORKSHOP ON LARGE SCALE EXPLOITS AND EMERGENT
THREATS (2010), available at www.usenix.org/event/leet10/tech/www.usenix.org/event/
leet10/tech/www.usenix.org/event/leet10/tech/tech.html#Rajab.
95. Press Release, Internet Crime Complaint Center, Pop-up Advertisements Offering
Anti-virus Software Pose Threat to Internet Users (Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.
ic3.gov/media/2009/091211.aspx.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (Comment e) (1965).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
98. WEBROOT SOFTWARE, INC., PROTECTING YOUR DIGITAL LIFE 2 (2008), available at
http://www.webroot.com/shared/pdf/2008_Consumer_SOIS-Protecting_Your_Digital_Life.
pdf. In 2007, forty-six million people in the U.S. and U.K. lost personal files on their computers, in part because approximately forty-five percent of consumers backup their home
data only once per year or less. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-2\SFT201.txt

202

unknown

Seq: 18

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

6-JUL-11

14:32

[Vol. XXVIII

consumers, but clearly inapplicable. Remedies for trespass to chattels
are applicable, but inadequate. It is unrealistic to expect that ordinary
consumers will be able to exercise their privilege of self-help so effectively as to defeat hordes of professional programmers in a battle of wits
over spyware installations. The other alternative is to await the level of
computer damage necessary to pursue a trespass to chattels claim.
Neither alternative is acceptable. Thus, a statutory remedy grounded in
real property principles is a preferable solution.
IV. A PROPOSED CONSUMER DIGITAL TRESPASS ACT.
Consumers are both the most highly targeted victims of spyware and
the least able to exercise self-help to defeat the onslaught of spyware
activity they face. Consumers need stronger legal protection to control
their desktops and return to productive and enjoyable computer uses.
Legislation that recognizes a right to exclude spyware and that creates a
private right of action to recover damages for spyware installed without
proper notice and express consent will be a significant consumer protection achievement.
This article proposes the enactment of a Consumer Digital Trespass
Act (hereinafter, the “CDTA”)99 that protects the inviolability interest of
consumer computer owners in a manner similar to real estate interests
under tort law.100 The CDTA allows consumers to self-identify their
computers as “consumer digital property” by installing a “digital boundary” on their computing devices, such as computers, cable or DSL
modems,101 wireless transmitters or even mobile phones accessing the
Internet.102 The digital boundary is simply a standard form digital file
that any incoming or outgoing transmission could readily detect. The
function of the digital boundary file is to provide notice in all communications to or from the computing device that the device is protected under
the CDTA. Anyone seeking to install spyware on a device or to transmit
protected data from the device would be required to design their software
to detect the digital boundary and comply with the CDTA in order to
avoid digital trespass liability.
Under the CDTA, “digital trespasses” can occur either by unauthorized transmissions into the computing devices, or by unauthorized
transmissions out of the device.103 The types of digital trespass are
99. The proposed Consumer Digital Trespass Act (hereinafter “CDTA”) is attached as
Appendix 1.
100. See App. 1.
101. See Thomas Claburn, DSL Modems Becoming Botnet Zombies, INFORMATION WEEK
(Mar. 25, 2009, 4:58 PM), available at, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=216300399.
102. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 1(b).
103. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 2.
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based upon threats identified in the SPY-ACT passed by the U.S. House
of Representatives in 2007104 and the threats identified by the AntiSpyware Coalition.105 The CDTA enumerates nine forms of incoming
digital transmissions that constitute a digital trespass if installed on the
device. Examples of the most serious incoming trespasses are installation of monitoring software used for keylogging, for disabling of the digital boundary file, or other security or anti-spyware software, for
collection of personally identifiable information,106 or for using the device to send spam, deliver ads or as part of a botnet to spread malware or
cause damage to other computers.107 Incoming transmissions that are
not prohibited by the CDTA may be received into the computer without
legal consequence, unless they cause harm to or interfere with the
computer.108
Consumers may consent to incoming installations, provided that a
“robust notice” as defined in the CDTA precedes such consent.109 Robust
notice requires explicit disclosure of the potentially harmful features of
the software to be installed. It also requires an affirmative consent by
the user to each offending installation, along with an option to abandon
the installation and remove the item completely at any time. Providing
consent by means of a browsewrap agreement or by terms of use on a
website would not be sufficient. A digital trespass occurs if the software
is installed on the device without robust notice.
The CDTA also enumerates seven forms of outgoing transmissions
that constitute a digital trespass.110 Examples of outgoing digital trespasses are transmissions of spam, botnets, distributed denial of service
attacks, or for disclosure of web browsing history or personally identifiable information. Consumers may provide an “informed consent” to
these transmissions that complies with the CDTA.111 Informed consent
requires 1) a clear and conspicuous warning that the protected information is about to be transmitted, 2) an affirmative consent, and 3) the option to completely remove or “uninstall” the software being used to
104. Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act (SPY-ACT), H.R. 964, 110th
Cong. (2007).
105. ANTI-SPYWARE COALITION, BEST PRACTICES: GUIDELINES TO CONSIDER IN THE EVALUATION OF POTENTIALLY UNWANTED TECHNOLOGIES (2007), http://www.antispywarecoalition.
org/documents/documents/best_practices_final_working_report.pdf.
106. CDTA, infra App.1, at Section 1 (g). The definition of personally identifiable information also is taken from the SPY-ACT, supra note 104.
107. CDTA, infra App. 1, Section 2 (a).
108. Causing harm or interference with the computer would trigger trespass to chattels
liability under existing tort law as discussed in Section II, supra.
109. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 1 (h). The concepts of robust notice and informed
consent were developed in an article by Jordan M. Blanke. See Blanke, supra note 83.
110. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 2 (b).
111. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 1 (f). See Blanke, supra note 83.
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transmit the information.112 Transmissions of prohibited information
without satisfying all three features of informed consent are a digital
trespass.
Digital trespasses under the CDTA trigger a statutory damage remedy without the need for the consumer to show damage to the computing
device or any other harm. This right of recovery is substantially limited
so as to avoid unduly burdening the network benefits of the Internet.
First, the CDTA only protects designated consumer computers. Corporate and business interests make greater use of the network benefits of
the Internet but business computers will be unaffected. Businesses are
capable of understanding the risks and rewards of their online presence
and can calculate the costs and benefits for their business accordingly.
They have the money and expertise to use self-help to limit their exposure to spyware and to protect their valuable information from Internet
risks. Business interests also are able to spread the risks and costs of
security measures through insurance and through pricing of their goods
and services.
Second, not every unwelcome incoming or outgoing transmission to
consumers’ computers causes a digital trespass. The CDTA identifies
only the most harmful and disruptive spyware operations113 as digital
trespasses. Unwelcome messages such as those that Ken Hamidi sent to
Intel Corporation would not trigger CDTA liability even if sent to consumer computers. The CDTA will have no effect on freedom of speech
and will preserve the network benefits of free information flow on the
Internet. In addition, the consumer can authorize even those transmissions restricted by the CDTA if the muscular “robust notice” and “informed consent” requirements are met. Consumers can decide for
themselves in real time whether the so-called “free” content they receive
is valuable enough to earn their informed consent. The CDTA merely
provides them with full knowledge that in the future they may experience interferences with their computing power, bandwidth and privacy
interests in exchange for that content. This approach protects the beneficial network effects of the Internet by continuing the widespread sharing of information among Internet participants, while imposing liability
only on the most harmful spyware transmissions.
Consumers can recover nominal statutory damages for digital trespass without proof of actual damage to their computing devices.114 In
essence, the CDTA makes the consumer computer partially inviolable.
While this may seem oxymoronic, it protects consumers from most harmful spyware activities in their dealings with otherwise legitimate busi112. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 1 (f).
113. See SPY-ACT, supra note 104; ANTI-SPYWARE COALITION, supra note 105.
114. CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 3 & Section 5(c).
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ness and commercial interests. Yet, it does not trigger a flood of liability
for de minimus interferences with consumer computers that have been
heavily criticized by opponents of the early cybertrespass cases. Actual
damages also are recoverable for harm to the computer and its operations and for consequential damages that result.115 Because the statutory damages are small with respect to each transmission and each
individual consumer, class actions are specifically authorized116 as is the
recovery of attorney fees and costs.117 Losses to offenders will be substantial if the spyware users commit digital trespasses on a large scale,
and thus will act as a strong deterrent.
Perhaps the most important remedy is the joint and several liability
of all parties who either participate in installing or using spyware to
track consumers’ behavior while they use their own computers or those
who distribute the information gathered by spyware monitoring.118 The
behavioral marketing “ecosystem” includes advertisers, advertising
agencies, web publishers, Internet access services providers, desktop application software providers and online advertising networks.119 With
the growing market for online advertising exceeding $20 billion dollars,
the participants in this ecosystem all profit from being able to compile
sophisticated profiles of consumer Internet users using the most advanced tracking tools. This allows the advertisements to be targeted,
relevant, and most cost-effective. These detailed consumer profiles are
valuable and very profitable for those who compile, sell and use them.
Perhaps the most extreme proposal was for ad networks, such as
NebuAd, to partner with ISPs to analyze all consumer communications
using a “deep packet inspection” technique.120
The CDTA seeks to “follow the money” as it moves through the behavioral advertising ecosystem by holding all participants jointly responsible for legal compliance with the CDTA. This will ensure that
advertisers and other industry participants will not turn a blind eye to
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 5 (b).
CDTA, infra App. 1, Section 5 (f).
CDTA, infra App. 1, at Section 5 (d).
CDTA, infra App. 1, at §5(e).
FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 45, at 19. These Principles were jointly developed by
the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Association of National Advertisers,
the Council of Better Business Bureaus, the Direct Marketing Association, and the Interactive Advertising Bureau. Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, IAB
(July 2009), http://www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf.
120. See Center for Democracy & Technology, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL WIRETAP
ACT, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT, AND STATE TWO-PARTY CONSENT LAWS OF
RELEVANCE TO THE NEBUAD SYSTEM AND OTHER USES OF INTERNET TRAFFIC CONTENT FROM
ISPS FOR BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2008), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20080708ISPtraffic.pdf.
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deceptive methods for installing monitoring software or to be willfully
ignorant of improper consent when creating the ad distribution networks. Reputable advertisers would insist on fully compliant advertising agencies, partners and networks to avoid liability and damage to
their brands. Any new information transmitted from existing spyware
installations would have to comply with the informed consent requirements of the CDTA. This would, in most cases, require that already installed monitoring software be disabled or removed, or to be modified
and replaced with new CDTA-compliant installations. These new installations would have to comply with the CDTA’s robust notice provisions.
The behavioral advertising model is based on the questionable assumption that consumers make fully informed and knowledgeable
choices about the costs and benefits of their online behavior. Consumers
readily perceive the benefits they receive from the use of purportedly
“free” software or website access, but they do not truly understand their
costs. Consumers bear the costs of behavioral advertising in the form of
lost privacy, diminished computer performance and a poor user experience. Often the “consent” consumers provide in license agreements, privacy policies or in the terms of use of a browsewrap agreement is of
questionable integrity.121 Many consumers, if not most, would be unaware of the full nature, extent and frequency of the online surveillance to
which they are subjected and of the degree to which their information is
sold and aggregated to support behavioral advertising.122 Consumers
have little, if any, control over their data once it has been captured from
their computers. The CDTA enables consumer choices by making the
cost-benefit calculation more transparent and explicit for the consumer
by requiring affirmative opt-in provisions both for incoming and outgoing
transmissions. They are able to affirm or change these choices with each
transmission. If the value of the “free” content is sufficient to justify the
costs - once fully understood - then the behavioral advertising industry
will remain essentially unchanged by the CDTA.
121. See e.g, Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545 (2006) and Nancy S.
Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR.L.REV 797, 822 (2007).
122. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor. Americans’ Attitudes About Internet Behavioral Advertising Practices, WPES ‘10: Proceedings of the 9th Annual ACM
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, (Oct. 4, 2010) available at http://www.
aleecia.com/authors-drafts/wpes-behav-AV.pdf. This may be especially true for consumers
who share a computer among several family members. For example, a child might be induced to visit several web sites whose terms of use give broad consent to install monitoring
software that could copy address books, or download web browsing histories, or obtain
other private information that can be sold on to data aggregators, behavioral advertising
firms or other third parties. Adult users of the same computer would be unlikely to know
that the computer was surreptitiously running monitoring software that reported their
every online movement.
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A more likely scenario is that consumers will insist on greater value
in the content they access, or will demand lower costs in terms of their
lost privacy and their computer’s performance. The CDTA shifts the
costs of using spyware for behavioral advertising back to the parties who
both benefit most from it and have the greatest ability and opportunity
to reduce or prevent the costs to consumers. Not every incoming or outgoing transmission triggers CDTA liability. Only the most harmful practices listed in the CDTA will make behavioral advertisers liable.
Advertisers can tailor their activities either to avoid prohibited activities
or to obtain the required informed consent. Consumers will likely avoid
sites that frequently ask them to consent to outgoing transmissions, either because of the privacy implications or the inconvenience of multiple
interruptions. They also may, at any time, exercise the option to uninstall the monitoring software that transmits the protected information.
They will gravitate to sites that offer the highest quality content with
minimal privacy risk or intrusion on their user experience. This will create a strong incentive for advertisers to limit outgoing transmissions to
the bare minimum necessary to support the free site content.
Governmental response to the problem of spyware use in behavioral
advertising has been tepid. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
not promulgated any enforceable regulations to limit this use of spyware.
Instead, the FTC has focused on a program of industry self-regulation
first proposed in December 2007.123 Public comments encouraged the
FTC to revise and strengthen the self-regulatory guidelines. In February 2009, the FTC released the new voluntary guidelines.124 In July
2009, a coalition of industry groups, led by the Interactive Advertising
Bureau (IAB), responded with proposed self-regulation principles for industry participants.125 The IAB proposal carefully defined “behavioral
advertising” to exclude coverage of several industry practices that affect
consumer privacy. Privacy advocacy groups criticized both the FTC and
IAB schemes as inadequate. These groups instead recommended federal
legislation to deal more comprehensively with online privacy interests
based on Fair Information Principles.126
The FTC, industry and privacy group proposals are helpful because
they address a broad spectrum of behavioral advertising industry practices that are harmful to consumer privacy. However, industry self-regu123. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCI1 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf.
124. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 45.
125. Id.
126. CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY ET AL., ONLINE BEHAVIORAL TRACKING AND
TARGETING, LEGISLATIVE PRIMER SEPTEMBER 2009 4 (2009), http://www.democraticmedia.
org/files/privacy-legislative-primer.pdf.

PLES
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latory programs are unlikely to be successful because they are not likely
to cover or be enforced against all entities, and are unlikely to be fully
implemented.127 The FTC admits that its self-regulatory guidelines are
heavily dependent upon industry members’ own willingness to “actively
monitor compliance and ensure that violations have consequences.”128
Because industry members are not legally required to follow the FTC
principles, any FTC investigation and enforcement will likely be based
on the FTC’s general principles governing unfair or deceptive practices.129 Proposals for comprehensive federal privacy legislation are necessary and highly desirable, but may take several years to enact. In
addition, these proposals would rely on the FTC for investigation and
enforcement. The FTC has a broad consumer protection mandate and
limited enforcement resources. Enforcement of any new privacy legislation will likely be as limited as its response to spyware - an infrequent
handful of enforcement actions.130
The CDTA approach to the issue of behavioral advertising is more
focused, clear, and empowering for consumers. It does not attempt to
solve the full range of privacy concerns that arise once spyware has collected private consumer data. The CDTA addresses the problem of behavioral advertising by focusing on the consumer’s desktop, which is the
primary source of the surreptitious data collection that is used to build
consumers’ advertising profiles. Instead of broad privacy principles, it
clearly defines specific forms of prohibited conduct and the actions required for behavioral advertisers to obtain robust notice and informed
consent from consumers. This clarity provides a safe harbor for the behavioral advertising industry to seek information from consumers in a
transparent way that respects consumers’ informed choices about their
privacy.
The CDTA empowers consumers in a number of ways. It protects
the computer owner’s inviolability interest in the use and control of their
own property by correcting the flaws in the trespass to chattels rules
under the Hamidi case. It gives consumers power to make a truly informed choice in real time about the costs and benefits of the “free” content and access they receive on the Internet as they are accessing the
127. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: INCURRENT SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NECESSARY, BUT STILL INSUFFICIENT
ON ITS OWN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 3, 35 (2009), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT%20On
line%20Behavioral%20Advertising%20Report.pdf.
128. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 45, at 47.
129. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: INDUSTRY’S CURRENT SELF-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NECESSARY, BUT STILL INSUFFICIENT
ON ITS OWN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS, supra note 124.
130. See discussion supra at note 39 and accompanying text.
DUSTRY’S
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content. Finally, the CDTA’s private right of action places both the control of the computer and control of the legal remedy in the same hands the consumer computer owner. When faced with the possibility of class
action lawsuits, statutory damages and attorneys’ fees and costs, behavioral advertisers will have strong incentives to limit the data they collect
from consumer computers. They also will be motivated to develop and
enforce stringent advertising placement practices and will partner only
with behavioral advertising partners capable of rigorous compliance with
the CDTA.
CONCLUSION
This article proposes that a Consumer Digital Trespass Act be enacted to give consumers the power to take action to protect themselves
against the spyware used to monitor their behavior online. The CDTA
fills the gap between the tort remedies of trespass to land and trespass to
chattels that leave consumers without a meaningful remedy to spyware
risks. The CDTA’s narrow focus preserves the network benefits of the
Internet. The CDTA’s clear requirements for robust notice and informed
consent give consumers a transparent and effective choice to control and
protect the private data on their computers. The CDTA’s remedies create the proper incentives for behavioral advertisers to limit the amount
of information they collect and to collect information responsibly. The
CDTA strikes a proper balance between the benefits of the “free” content
supported by behavioral advertising and the right of consumers to control the operations of their own computers and access to the private information stored on them.
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APPENDIX 1
THE CONSUMER DIGITAL TRESPASS ACT
Section 1. DEFINITIONS.
For the purposes of this Act(a) Authorized User means the owner or lessee of consumer digital
property or any person in the owner or lessee’s household authorized by
the owner or lessee to use the consumer digital property.
(b) Computer means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction
with such device. This term includes a modem, router or other transmission device connected to the computer and a mobile phone used to connect to the Internet.
(c) Consumer means a natural person.
(d) Consumer Digital Property means a computer owned or leased
by a consumer that is used by authorized users primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes, and on which a digital boundary has been
installed.
(e) Digital Boundary means a digital data file or document in a form
prescribed by the United States Federal Trade Commission and stored
on consumer digital property. The digital boundary shall be 1) in a form
detectable by other computers which attempt to access or transmit information to or from consumer digital property by means of the Internet or
any computer network; 2) shall provide notice that the computer on
which the digital boundary is installed is consumer digital property; 3)
provide notice of the state in which the consumer is a resident; and 4)
provide a reference to this Act.
(f) Informed Consent means a clear and conspicuous notice in a form
specified by the United States Federal Trade Commission, which shall
contain all of the following elements:
(1) For each digital trespass activity described in Section 2 (b), (1) to
(6), a separate Warning Statement shall be displayed on successive computer screens: “Warning - software installed or executed on your computer is being used to transmit information to {insert description from
applicable section of Section 2 (b), (1) to (6)}. Would you like to: 1) Stop
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the transmission of the information, or 2) Consent to the transmission,
or 3) Remove the software from your computer?”A clearly labeled clickable button shall be provided for each option.
(2) The default option shall be to stop the transmission.
(3) If affirmative consent is given, for successive outgoing transmission described in Section 2 (b), (1) to (6), a separate warning, as applicable, shall be displayed, and the notices specified in (a) and (b) above shall
be completed with regard to each successive digital trespass activity described in Section 2 (b), (1) to (6) that is applicable.
(4) The requirement of informed consent may not be waived, limited
or modified.
(g) Personally Identifiable Information means the following information, to the extent only that such information allows a living individual to be identified or re-identified from that information:
(1) First and last name of an individual.
(2) A home or other physical address of an individual, including
street name, name of a city or town, and zip code.
(3) An electronic mail address.
(4) A telephone number.
(5) A social security number, tax identification number, passport
number, driver’s license number, or any other government-issued identification number.
(6) A credit card number.
(7) Any access code, password, or account number, other than an
access code or password transmitted by an owner or authorized user of a
protected computer to the intended recipient to register for, or log onto, a
web page or other Internet service or a network connection or service of a
subscriber that is protected by an access code or password.
(8) Date of birth, birth certificate number, or place of birth of an
individual, except in the case of a date of birth transmitted or collected
for the purpose of compliance with the law.
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(h) Robust Notice means a clear and conspicuous notice in a form
specified by the United States Federal Trade Commission, which shall be
contain all of the following elements:
(1) For each digital trespass activity described in Section 2 (a), (1) to
(9), a separate Warning Statement shall be displayed on successive computer screens: “Warning - if installed, this software will {insert description from applicable section of Section 2 (a), (1) to (9)}. Do you consent to
continue the installation of this software?”
(2) The default option shall be to deny consent and to abandon or
cancel the installation.
(3) Upon affirmative consent, the user shall be presented with the
option to obtain a clear description of the software to be installed and its
functions and the type of information to be collected, if any, and the manner in which it may be used, before proceeding with the installation. The
default option shall be to view the information. After viewing the
description, or upon declining the option to view, the user shall be
presented with another screen stating: “Do you consent to continue the
installation of this software?” The default option shall be to deny consent and to abandon or cancel the installation.
(4) If affirmative consent is given, the next successive applicable
warning regarding a digital trespass activity described in Section 2 (a),
(1) to (9), if any, shall be displayed, and the notices specified in (h)(1)
through (h)(3) above shall be provided with regard to each successive
form of digital trespass activity described in Section 2 (a), (1) to (9) that
is applicable.
(5) Only after all warnings have been displayed, and affirmative
consent is given to each warning displayed, shall robust notice be considered completed and the software of information may be permitted to
download.
(6) The requirement of robust notice may not be waived, limited or
modified.
Section 2. DIGITAL TRESPASS. The following acts shall constitute a
digital trespass:
(a) transmitting to consumer digital property any computer
software, information collection program or other digital code or instructions that is installed, stored or executed on consumer digital property
without robust notice to the authorized user, by any person who is not an

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-2\SFT201.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 29

PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM SPYWARE

6-JUL-11

14:32

213

authorized user, that is used or may be used to exercise control over the
computer’s functions, processes, or settings to:
(1) divert the Internet browser of the computer, or similar program
of the computer used to access and navigate the Internet, away from the
site the user intended to view, to one or more other web pages, such that
the user is prevented from viewing the content at the intended web page;
(2) utilize such computer to send unsolicited information or material
from the computer to others, including unsolicited email or transmissions used as part of a distributed denial of service attack;
(3) access, hijack, or otherwise use the modem, or Internet connection or service, for the computer for a service not authorized by the owner
or authorized user;
(4) use the computer as part of an activity performed by a group of
computers that causes damage to another computer or a violation of this
Act on other consumer digital property, including sending of unsolicited
email or transmissions used as part of a distributed denial of service
attack;
(5) deliver advertisements or a series of advertisements that a user
of the computer cannot close without undue effort or knowledge by the
user or without turning off the computer or closing all sessions of the
Internet browser for the computer;
(6) modify settings related to use of the computer or to the computer’s access to or use of the Internet by altering—
(i) the web page that appears when the owner or authorized user
launches an Internet browser or similar program used to access and navigate the Internet;
(ii) the default provider used to access or search the Internet, or
other existing Internet connections settings;
(iii) a list of bookmarks used by the computer to access web pages;
or
(iv) security or other settings of the computer that protect information about the owner or authorized user;
(7) collect personally identifiable information through the use of a
keystroke logging function or any other information collection program;
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(8) collect information regarding web pages accessed using the computer through the use of a keystroke logging function or any other information collection program; or
(9) remove, disable, or render inoperative a digital boundary file, or
any security, anti-spyware, or anti-virus technology installed on the computer; or,
(b) transmitting from consumer digital property by means of computer software or hardware, an information collection program or any
other digital code or instructions, whether or not installed or stored on
consumer digital property, by any person who is not an authorized user,
without the informed consent of an authorized user, any computer
software, information collection program, any other digital code or instructions or any information or data that is or may be executed or otherwise controlled or used to:
(1) send unsolicited information or material from the computer to
others;
(2) access, hijack, or otherwise use the modem, or Internet connection or service, for the computer;
(3) use the computer as part of an activity performed by a group of
computers that causes damage to another computer;
(4) disclose any personally identifiable information of any authorized user of the computer;
(5) disclose any information regarding web pages accessed using the
computer that is used to deliver advertising to, or display advertising on,
the computer; or
(6) remove, disable, or render inoperative a digital boundary, or a
security, anti-spyware, or anti-virus technology installed on the
computer.
(c) Limitation on Information Retention. Retention of any personally identifiable information or any web page access information that is
disclosed or collected pursuant to informed consent under this Act may
not be retained for more than 90 days after the date of informed consent
unless the information is modified so as to no longer be identifiable to
any specific person or computing device or any IP address.

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-2\SFT201.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 31

PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM SPYWARE

6-JUL-11

14:32

215

Section 3. DAMAGE NOT REQUIRED.
It is unnecessary to prove any damage to the computer hardware,
computer devices or systems or processing power, software, and any contents stored on the computer in order to recover in a civil action the remedies set forth in Section 5.
Section 4. INTENTION UNNECESSARY.
It is unnecessary to prove any intention to commit a digital trespass
or intention to cause damage or harm in order to recover under this Act.
The only intention required is the intention to cause the transmission of
the computer software, information collection program or other digital
code or instructions that result in the digital trespass.
Section 5. REMEDIES.
(a) Private Right of Action. Any owner of consumer digital property
who suffers a digital trespass may commence a civil action for injunctive
relief and the other remedies specified in this section.
(b) Damages. Any person who commits digital trespass shall be liable for any damage caused to the consumer digital property including the
computer hardware, computer systems or processing power, software,
and any contents stored on the computer, and for any consequential
damages resulting therefrom.
(c) Statutory Damages: For digital trespasses under Section 2 (a),
statutory damages of $.10 per trespass shall be awarded. For digital trespasses under Section 2 (b), statutory damages of $.25 per trespass shall
be awarded.
(d) Attorney Fees and Costs. Costs shall be allowed to the owner of
the consumer digital property unless the court otherwise directs. The
court in its discretion may award attorneys’ fees to the owner of the consumer digital property if the party causing a digital trespass has willfully engaged in digital trespass.
(e) Joint and Several Liability. If a digital trespass occurs in connection with the delivery of advertising to, or display advertising on the
computer, then all parties who received any consideration in connection
with causing the delivery or display in violation of this act shall be
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jointly and severally liable for all damages, costs, attorney fees and other
remedies awarded under this Act.
(f) Class Actions Authorized. Class actions to recover remedies
under this Act are specifically authorized.

